Guyana Anti‑Corruption Network (GACN) | 13 April 2026Part of the Pomeroon Trading team: From left are: Consultant Doug Hardman; Chief Scientist, Dr. Andrew Watson; CEO Duncan Turnbull; and Co-Founders Neil Passmore and Hayden Chittell
Bitter harvest, Part 3 & 4: The $30,000 hoax – A shell company, Pomeroon Trading & the carbon credit mirage
Part Three: Pomeroon Trading – The Bitter Harvest Comes Home – Zena Stoll’s Fight for Justice
## PART THREE: THE COLLAPSE, THE COURTROOM, AND THE POLITICIAN WHO RAN
**How a 91‑year‑old Guyanese landowner was left with a ruined estate, a Canadian carbon company imploded under regulatory pressure, and David Lammy “ran as far as he could.”**
—
### I. The Ruin of the Stoll Estate
While corporate filings in Vancouver painted a picture of a thriving carbon credit enterprise, the reality on the ground in the Pomeroon region told a very different story.
**Zena Stoll**, now 91 years old, had leased her family’s 700‑acre Stoll Estate to Pomeroon Trading in 2017. At the launch, she had publicly called the company the “perfect partner to turn our land into a world‑class business.” But the partnership did not last.
In court filings, Ms. Stoll alleges that Pomeroon Trading failed to pay **$387,000 (£288,000) in rent** and caused **$500,000 in damages**. She claims that under the company’s management, “buildings fell into disrepair, families who had worked on the estate for many years left, and the drainage system began to lose efficiency.” Her legal team accuses Neil Passmore of having “taken advantage” of her when she handed control of her family’s legacy to his company after he obtained a lease agreement from her in 2017.
Pomeroon Trading has filed a counterclaim, arguing that Ms. Stoll leased the property on “false pretences” and that she failed to provide documentation proving she was the estate’s rightful owner – which, the company claims, “scuppered plans to drum up investment.” The company is seeking $100,000 in damages and a refund of all rent paid.
The case is currently being heard in the **High Court of Guyana**. As of the date of this report, no final judgment has been issued.
For Ms. Stoll, the legal battle is not just about money. It is about the destruction of a family legacy. “I grew up on the Stoll estate and my parents planted it,” she had said at the launch. Those words now ring hollow.
—
### II. The Implosion of Carbon Done Right
While the High Court deliberates, the corporate parent that acquired Pomeroon Trading has itself fallen into deep distress.
**Carbon Done Right Developments Inc.** (formerly Klimat X Developments Inc.) – the TSX Venture Exchange‑listed company that bought 65% of Pomeroon Trading for $30,000 – has faced a series of dramatic setbacks that raise serious questions about the viability of its entire business model.
**Regulatory Cease Trade Order**
On **July 30, 2025**, a Cease Trade Order (CTO) was issued against Carbon Done Right by Canadian regulators under National Policy 12‑207, which addresses failure‑to‑file cease trade orders and revocations in multiple jurisdictions. The CTO halted all trading in the company’s shares. On August 5, 2025, the Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) formally suspended trading of Carbon Done Right’s stock on the TSX Venture Exchange under the symbol KLX.
The bulletin noted that “upon revocation of the Cease Trade Order, the Company’s shares will remain suspended until the Company meets TSX Venture Exchange requirements. Members are prohibited from trading in the securities of the companies during the period of the suspension or until further notice.”
**Desperate Fundraising**
In the months leading up to the CTO, Carbon Done Right engaged in a series of increasingly desperate fundraising efforts. In January 2025, the company announced a non‑brokered private placement, which it later upsized and extended. The offering was expected to close during January 2025, subject to the receipt of all necessary approvals, including the conditional approval of the TSX Venture Exchange.
By May 2025, the company was still struggling to close its financing, announcing yet another non‑brokered private placement and a shares‑for‑debt settlement.
**Plummeting Revenue**
The company’s financial collapse is stark. According to insider tracking data, Carbon Done Right’s revenues decreased by **61%** to just C$68,000 in 2024. Net loss applicable to common stockholders increased by **40%** to C$6.3 million. In other words, a publicly traded company that had acquired a Guyanese coconut farm, a Sierra Leone rewilding project, and a Mexican mangrove restoration contract was generating less revenue than a small retail shop – and losing millions of dollars doing so.
**The Carbon Credit Mirage Persists**
As of the date of this report, there is **no evidence** that any carbon credits have been generated from the Guyana Coconut segment. The company’s own website continues to describe the partnership with Pomeroon – Caribbean Coconuts & Spices as one that “will drive sustainability and meaningful impact” – but no verified carbon credits have been issued.
The Sierra Leone project, the company’s flagship, has been submitted for validation under Verra’s protocol, but actual carbon credit issuance remains in progress. The Guyana asset – acquired for $30,000 – remains a paper asset, a placeholder on a portfolio that has failed to deliver any return to investors.
—
### III. David Lammy: The Politician Who “Ran as Far as He Could”
The most prominent figure associated with Pomeroon Trading is not a Guyanese official or a Canadian executive, but **David Lammy**, the British Deputy Prime Minister and Justice Secretary, whose parents are from Guyana.
Lammy served as an **unpaid adviser** to Pomeroon Trading and held shares in the company between 2019 and 2024. He toured the plantation with Guyanese government officials and foreign investors, and publicly declared that the company was “proof that the country’s Green State development strategy is serving in parallel to attract investment, expertise and responsible practice to the agriculture industry.”
But when the company collapsed and the landowner came forward, Lammy’s involvement took a darker turn.
**The Allegation of Abandonment**
Ms. Stoll claims that Lammy gave her his mobile phone number in 2018 after she attended an event in London at which he had endorsed Pomeroon, telling her to call him if she had any questions. When the dispute with Pomeroon Trading erupted, she tried to phone him – but received no answer.
She tracked him down to a hotel in Georgetown, the Guyanese capital, in 2023 and waited in the lobby for three days, sending him notes. She received no reply.
“He abandoned me,” she told The Telegraph. “I depended on him to put in a word for me… I’m disappointed in you, minister.”
**Stanley Ming**, a Guyanese businessman who approached Lammy on Ms. Stoll’s behalf, was even more direct: “When David recognised what was playing out, he ran as far as he could.”
**Lammy’s Defence**
A spokesman for Lammy has defended his client, stating that he had no operational role in the company and was not involved in its day‑to‑day management, HR, contractual, or financial arrangements. The spokesman also stated that Mr. Lammy disposed of his shares for a “nominal sum of £500” upon entering government in July 2024.
But for Ms. Stoll, the defence rings hollow. A man who had publicly championed the company, who had given her his phone number, who had stood beside her at the launch – that man, she says, disappeared when she needed him most.
**The GACN Investigation asks: Did David Lammy know about the financial distress of Pomeroon Trading before he sold his shares for £500? Did he ever conduct any due diligence on the company he was endorsing? And what responsibility does a public figure have to the people he encourages to trust the ventures he champions?**
—
### IV. The Government of Guyana: A Conspicuous Silence
The Government of Guyana and the Ministry of Agriculture were not passive observers in this story. They were active participants in legitimising Pomeroon Trading.
In 2018, the company met with then Agriculture Minister Noel Holder and NAREI CEO Dr. Oudho Homenauth, who praised the investment and pledged full support. In 2021, the company met with Agriculture Minister Zulfikar Mustapha, who **complimented the team for their investment** and assured them that new opportunities would be made available. The Ministry issued press releases celebrating the company’s plans. NAREI pledged technical support and partnership.
Yet, when the company collapsed, when the landowner Zena Stoll came forward with allegations of unpaid rent and a ruined estate, when it emerged that the company had been sold for a mere $30,000 to a Canadian shell company pivoting to carbon credits – **the Government of Guyana issued no public statement.**
The Ministry of Agriculture has continued its broader coconut sector support programmes. In 2025, the government announced a major coconut expansion in the Pomeroon, with Agriculture Minister Zulfikar Mustapha reaffirming “Government’s commitment to aggressively expanding the coconut industry, noting that the Pomeroon project is a critical part of that national strategy.” The government also imported 70,000 high‑yielding Brazilian coconuts as part of this push.
But on the specific matter of Pomeroon Trading – the company it once embraced – the government has remained **completely silent**.
**The GACN Investigation asks:**
– Did the Ministry of Agriculture conduct any due diligence on Pomeroon Trading before endorsing it?
– Was the government aware that the company was simultaneously being positioned as a carbon credit asset for a Canadian shell company?
– Why has the government failed to intervene on behalf of a 91‑year‑old Guyanese landowner whose family estate was allegedly destroyed by a foreign‑owned company that the government itself had welcomed?
– Will there be any parliamentary inquiry into how this happened?
—
### V. A Pattern of Exploitation?
The Pomeroon Trading case may not be an isolated incident. Carbon Done Right’s business model appears to rely on acquiring distressed or undervalued agricultural assets, repackaging them as carbon credit projects, and using them to raise capital from public markets – all while the original landowners and communities are left to bear the consequences.
The company’s segments include “Guyana Coconut and Mixed Agriculture” alongside projects in Sierra Leone, Mexico, and Suriname. In Suriname, Pomeroon Suriname N.V. – a related entity – has begun a mangrove rehabilitation project in Coronie, combining environmental protection with coconut cultivation. The question is whether these projects are genuine agricultural and environmental initiatives, or whether they are simply assets being used to prop up a failing carbon credit speculation vehicle.
The GACN Investigation has not uncovered evidence of other Guyanese landowners with similar complaints against Pomeroon Trading. However, the structure of the transaction – a shell company acquiring a majority stake in a Guyanese agricultural venture for a nominal price – should prompt scrutiny of whether other vulnerable landowners have been exploited in similar ways.
—
### VI. The Human Cost
Behind the corporate filings, the regulatory cease trade orders, and the political manoeuvring, there is a human story.
Zena Stoll is 91 years old. She leased her family’s estate to Pomeroon Trading in the hope that it would be restored to its former glory. Instead, she says, it has been left in ruins. She is now fighting a legal battle against a company that has been sold to a Canadian carbon credit speculator, while the British politician who once championed her cause has, in her words, abandoned her.
She is not seeking charity. She is seeking justice – and accountability.
**The GACN Investigation calls on the Government of Guyana to answer a simple question: Where were you when this happened?**
Part Four: The Crimes – Securities Fraud, Money Laundering, and Possible Bribery in the Pomeroon Trading Scandal
## PART FOUR: THE VERDICT – ILLEGALITY, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND A CALL FOR PROSECUTION
**How the $30,000 acquisition of Pomeroon Trading may have violated securities laws, anti‑money laundering statutes, and director’s fiduciary duties – and why law enforcement on three continents must act.**
—
### I. Introduction: From Corporate Failure to Criminal Exposure
The previous three parts of this investigation have laid bare a disturbing narrative: a Guyanese coconut farm, publicly celebrated by the Ministry of Agriculture and backed by a future British Deputy Prime Minister, was sold for a mere $30,000 to a Canadian shell company that rebranded itself as a carbon credit enterprise. That company – now called Carbon Done Right Developments Inc. – has since been hit with a cease trade order, saw its revenues collapse by 61%, and remains unable to generate any verified carbon credits from the Guyanese asset it acquired.
But this is not merely a story of failed business ambitions. The pattern of conduct revealed by this investigation raises serious questions about potential criminal and regulatory violations across multiple jurisdictions.
This final part of the series examines the legal exposure of the key players, the duties of the regulators who failed to act, and the specific actions that law enforcement authorities in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Guyana must now take.
—
### II. Canadian Securities Law Violations
As the jurisdiction where the publicly traded parent company is listed, Canada has primary responsibility for investigating potential securities law violations arising from the acquisition of Pomeroon Trading.
**A. Material Misrepresentation and Securities Fraud**
The cornerstone of Canadian securities law is the prohibition against making a material misrepresentation – a false statement of a material fact or an omission of a material fact that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of a security.
The $30,000 acquisition price of Pomeroon Trading raises an obvious question: did Klimat X (now Carbon Done Right) accurately disclose the true value of the assets it was acquiring? The company’s own press release announcing the Change of Business transaction stated only that the terms were “not disclosed” – a phrase that should alarm any securities regulator. Detailed SEDAR filings that would provide a transparent accounting of the Pomeroon Trading acquisition, including any valuation analysis, due diligence reports, or independent fairness opinions, are not publicly available.
The company publicly promoted the Guyana Coconut segment as a core part of its carbon credit portfolio. Its website states: “Our partnership with Pomeroon – Caribbean Coconuts & Spices will drive sustainability and meaningful impact.” Yet there is no evidence that any carbon credits have ever been generated from this asset. If Klimat X represented to investors that the Guyana Coconut segment was a valuable carbon credit project when it knew – or recklessly disregarded – that no such credits existed or were likely to materialize, that could constitute a material misrepresentation.
Under Canadian securities law, fraud is defined broadly to include any act, omission or course of conduct that results in a misrepresentation that is relied upon by another person to their detriment. The definition of fraud varies by jurisdiction, but CSA members have consistently enforced prohibitions against fraudulent and manipulative trading practices. Individuals and corporations convicted of securities fraud can face significant fines based on the amount of money involved and the impact of the fraud. In addition to criminal penalties, securities regulators can impose administrative sanctions such as fines, disgorgement of profits, and restrictions on future trading or participation in the securities market.
Under British Columbia’s Securities Act, a person who contravenes the Act commits an offence and is liable – in the case of a person other than an individual – to a fine of not more than $1 million and, in the case of an individual, to a fine of not more than $1 million or imprisonment for not more than three years, or both. The most serious offences, such as insider trading and market manipulation, can result in fines of up to $1 million.
**B. The Cease Trade Order: A Regulatory Warning**
On July 30, 2025, the British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) issued a failure‑to‑file cease trade order against Carbon Done Right under National Policy 12‑207, which addresses failure‑to‑file cease trade orders and revocations in multiple jurisdictions. The CTO was issued due to the company’s failure to meet crucial filing requirements. All trading in the company’s securities is prohibited until the required filings are made and the CTO is revoked. On August 5, 2025, the Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) formally suspended trading of Carbon Done Right’s stock on the TSX Venture Exchange under the symbol KLX, noting that “Members are prohibited from trading in the securities of the companies during the period of the suspension or until further notice”.
While a failure‑to‑file CTO is not itself evidence of fraud, it is a significant regulatory red flag. The BCSC has a dedicated Criminal Investigations Branch that investigates offences under BC’s Securities Act – known as “quasi‑criminal offences” – and securities‑related offences in Canada’s Criminal Code. In 2014 alone, the BCSC conducted 22 administrative and three criminal proceedings, with the most common violations including those related to unregistered activity, illegal sales of securities and fraud. The fact that Carbon Done Right has attracted the attention of the BCSC – and that its shares remain suspended as of the date of this report – should prompt a deeper investigation into the company’s entire acquisition history, including the Pomeroon Trading transaction.
**C. The Reverse Merger: A Regulatory Loophole Exploited?**
The transaction that brought Pomeroon Trading into the public markets was a reverse takeover (RTO) – also known as a “back door listing” – involving a shell company, Earl Resources Limited, that was already listed on the NEX board, a market for relatively inactive or “shell” companies.
In a reverse takeover, a private company bypasses the regulatory hurdles of a traditional IPO by merging with a small, often dormant, shell company that already has a public listing. As legal commentators have noted, a reverse takeover “is generally regulated only by a stock exchange rather than, for a typical IPO, a securities commission or commissions tasked with the review and receipt of a prospectus”. This lighter regulatory touch creates opportunities for abuse.
The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) has itself published guidance on “regulatory concerns with certain asset or business acquisitions,” noting that those “primarily taking place in venture markets” raise “concerns regarding misleading disclosure”. The TSX Venture Exchange has codified policies governing Changes of Business and Reverse Takeovers, but these policies rely heavily on the accuracy of the disclosures made by the companies involved.
In the case of Klimat X, the company’s own press release announcing the Change of Business transaction stated that the terms of the acquisition of Pomeroon Trading were “not disclosed.” This lack of transparency – combined with the astonishingly low $30,000 valuation – should have triggered immediate scrutiny by the TSX Venture Exchange and the BCSC.
**D. Director’s Conflict of Interest: The Passmore Problem**
Perhaps the most glaring legal issue in this entire transaction is the role of Neil James Passmore.
Passmore was a co‑founder of Pomeroon Trading. Following the acquisition, he was appointed as a Director of Klimat X and its Director of Corporate Development. Critically, MarketWatch records show that on June 29, 2022 – the day of the acquisition – Passmore engaged in a transaction with the company at $0.00 per share.
Under the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) and the British Columbia Business Corporations Act (BCBCA), directors owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation. They must act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation. When a director finds themselves in a conflict of interest, they must promptly disclose the conflict and, where necessary, recuse themselves from board deliberations. The director must avoid being in a position where his or her personal interest would come into conflict with that of the corporation and must act in a disinterested manner. A director who discloses a conflict of interest must refrain from voting on any resolution to approve the contract or transaction giving rise to such conflict of interest. Where a director is prohibited from voting on a resolution due to a conflict of interest, the conflicted director is also prohibited from attending the portion of a meeting during which the transaction at issue is discussed.
In the Klimat X transaction, Passmore appears to have occupied both sides of the deal: as a founder of Pomeroon Trading, he was a seller; as a director of Klimat X, he was a buyer. This is a classic conflict of interest. There is no public evidence that Passmore disclosed this conflict, recused himself from board deliberations, or abstained from voting on the acquisition. If he failed to do so, he may have breached his fiduciary duties under the CBCA – a breach that can result in personal liability and, in egregious cases, criminal prosecution.
—
### III. Anti‑Money Laundering and Financial Intelligence Concerns
The $30,000 acquisition of a company that had publicly claimed millions in investment also raises questions under Guyana’s Anti‑Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Act.
Guyana’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is responsible for receiving and analyzing Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) from reporting entities such as banks, law firms, and other financial intermediaries. Under Section 18 of the AML/CFT Act, reporting entities must pay special attention to all unusually large business transactions, whether completed or not, and to all unusual patterns of transactions and to insignificant but periodic transactions which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose. If a transaction is suspected on reasonable grounds to be connected to the proceeds of criminal activity, money laundering or other infractions, the reporting entity must file an STR.
The $30,000 acquisition price – a fraction of the value that Pomeroon Trading had publicly claimed – would, in any reasonable analysis, be considered an “unusual” transaction. A Guyanese asset was sold to a Canadian company at a price that bore no apparent relationship to its claimed value. If any financial intermediary – a bank, a law firm, or an accounting firm – facilitated this transaction without filing an STR, it may have breached its obligations under the AML/CFT Act. The FIU has the power to impose sanctions on reporting entities for failure to comply with AML/CFT obligations.
Moreover, the discrepancy between the claimed value of Pomeroon Trading (US$3 million invested, an US$8 million processing facility planned) and the actual sale price ($30,000) raises the possibility of trade‑based money laundering – the practice of using legitimate trade and businesses as cover to move illegally attained assets around the world. If funds were moved from Guyana to Canada or the United Kingdom under the guise of a legitimate agricultural investment, the transaction should be scrutinized by the FIU, the Bank of Guyana, and the Guyana Securities Council.
The GACN Investigation calls on the Financial Intelligence Unit of Guyana to:
1. Request from all Guyanese financial institutions any records relating to the transfer of funds in connection with Pomeroon Trading.
2. Determine whether any Suspicious Transaction Reports were filed in relation to the $30,000 acquisition or any other transactions involving Pomeroon Trading.
3. Refer any evidence of money laundering to the Director of Public Prosecutions for criminal investigation.
—
### IV. The United Kingdom: Bribery of a Foreign Public Official and Director’s Liability
The involvement of David Lammy – a senior British politician who was at the time an MP and is now Deputy Prime Minister and Justice Secretary – introduces potential liability under the UK Bribery Act 2010.
Section 6 of the Bribery Act makes bribery of a foreign public official a stand‑alone distinct crime. A person (“P”) who bribes a foreign public official (“F”) is guilty of an offence if P’s intention is to influence F in F’s capacity as a foreign public official. The Act defines a “foreign public official” broadly and includes individuals holding legislative, administrative or judicial positions in a country outside the UK.
If any person or company associated with Pomeroon Trading offered, promised or gave any financial or other advantage to a Guyanese public official – including officials of the Ministry of Agriculture – in order to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business, that would constitute an offence under section 6 of the Bribery Act.
The GACN Investigation has not uncovered direct evidence of bribery. However, the speed and enthusiasm with which the Ministry of Agriculture embraced Pomeroon Trading – issuing press releases, providing technical support, and publicly complimenting the investment – combined with the company’s subsequent collapse, warrants scrutiny. The Ministry of Agriculture held multiple meetings with Pomeroon Trading executives in 2018 and 2021. It is not known whether any gifts, hospitality, or other advantages were provided to Guyanese officials by the company or its representatives.
Moreover, section 7 of the Bribery Act creates a corporate offence: a commercial organisation is guilty of an offence if a person associated with it bribes another person intending to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business for the organisation. The only defence is that the organisation had “adequate procedures” in place to prevent bribery. If Pomeroon Trading or Klimat X failed to maintain such procedures – and there is no evidence that they did – they could be liable under section 7.
In a striking irony, David Lammy – the very politician who was an unpaid adviser to Pomeroon Trading – announced in December 2025 that the UK would expand its domestic corruption unit at the City of London police, giving it £15 million in new funding to focus on bribery and other misconduct in UK financial services and public bodies. The GACN Investigation calls on that same unit to examine whether any of the individuals or companies involved in the Pomeroon Trading transaction – including Lammy himself – have violated the Bribery Act.
—
### V. Guyana: Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Breach of Director’s Duties
Within Guyana, the conduct of Pomeroon Trading and its directors may have violated the country’s criminal and corporate laws.
**A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Public**
Fraudulent misrepresentation occurs when a false statement is dishonestly made to someone, that person relies on the statement, enters into a deal, and then suffers a loss as a result. The false statement must be made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. In some cases, fraudulent misrepresentation can lead to criminal charges, especially if it involves financial fraud.
Pomeroon Trading made repeated public statements about its financial condition and future prospects:
– In 2017 and 2018, the company claimed to have made a “massive investment” in the Guyanese coconut industry, planting 5,000 trees every month.
– In 2021, the company announced a US$8 million (G$1.7 billion) processing facility.
– The company claimed to have invested approximately US$3 million since its founding.
– The company announced plans for an IPO at US$7.50 per share.
Yet, in June 2022, the company was sold for $30,000. This disparity – between the public claims and the actual sale price – is so vast that it raises an inference that the public claims were false or, at a minimum, recklessly exaggerated.
If the Ministry of Agriculture and the Government of Guyana relied on these representations in deciding to support Pomeroon Trading – issuing press releases, providing technical assistance, and publicly endorsing the company – then the government itself may be a victim of fraudulent misrepresentation. The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation appear to be present: a false statement of a material fact (the value and prospects of the company), made knowingly or recklessly, intended to induce reliance, and actual reliance by the government to its detriment (the government’s reputation and resources were committed to a company that had no real value).
Under Guyana’s Companies Act, officers of a company who are in default of their duties can be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine. Fraudulent acts are punishable with imprisonment, fines, or both.
**B. Breach of Duty to Zena Stoll**
The civil lawsuit brought by Zena Stoll against Pomeroon Trading – alleging unpaid rent of $387,000 and damages of $500,000 – also raises potential criminal exposure. If the court finds that Pomeroon Trading obtained the lease from Ms. Stoll through fraudulent misrepresentation – for example, by falsely representing its ability to pay rent or its intentions for the estate – that could constitute obtaining property by false pretences, a criminal offence under Guyanese law.
The GACN Investigation calls on the Director of Public Prosecutions of Guyana to:
1. Review the evidence gathered in Zena Stoll’s civil lawsuit to determine whether criminal charges should be filed against Pomeroon Trading and its directors.
2. Investigate whether Pomeroon Trading made false representations to the Ministry of Agriculture, and whether those representations constitute fraudulent misrepresentation under Guyanese criminal law.
3. Consider whether the Ministry of Agriculture itself bears any responsibility for failing to conduct due diligence before endorsing the company.
—
### VI. The Role of Law Enforcement and Financial Regulators: A Roadmap for Action
The web of potential violations spans three countries. Each jurisdiction has authorities with the power to investigate and prosecute. The GACN Investigation calls upon the following bodies to act:
**A. Canada**
1. **British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC)** : The BCSC should expand its existing inquiry into Carbon Done Right beyond the failure‑to‑file cease trade order. The Commission should investigate whether the company made material misrepresentations in its disclosure documents concerning the Pomeroon Trading acquisition and the value of the Guyana Coconut segment. The BCSC’s Criminal Investigations Branch should examine whether the $30,000 transaction involved securities fraud.
2. **TSX Venture Exchange**: The Exchange should review whether Klimat X complied with Policy 5.2 governing Changes of Business and Reverse Takeovers. If the company failed to make adequate disclosure, the Exchange should consider delisting the company’s shares.
3. **Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) – Integrated Market Enforcement Team (IMET)**: The RCMP’s IMET is responsible for investigating serious capital market fraud. The RCMP should examine whether the Pomeroon Trading acquisition involved market manipulation, insider trading, or other criminal offences under the Criminal Code.
4. **Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)**: FINTRAC should review any financial transactions between Canada and Guyana or the United Kingdom relating to the acquisition to determine whether any money laundering or terrorist financing indicators are present.
**B. United Kingdom**
1. **Serious Fraud Office (SFO)** : The SFO has jurisdiction to investigate serious or complex fraud, including bribery and corruption involving UK companies or citizens. The SFO should examine whether any UK‑based individuals or companies – including Neil Passmore and the UK companies he controls – engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with the Pomeroon Trading acquisition.
2. **City of London Police – Domestic Corruption Unit**: As noted above, David Lammy announced the expansion of this unit with £15 million in new funding. The unit should investigate whether any bribery or corruption occurred in connection with the company’s interactions with Guyanese public officials – and whether any of the individuals involved, including Lammy himself, have violated the Bribery Act 2010.
3. **National Crime Agency (NCA)** : The NCA should examine whether the movement of funds between the UK, Guyana, and Canada in connection with Pomeroon Trading constitutes money laundering.
**C. Guyana**
1. **Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)** : The FIU should request STR filings from all Guyanese financial institutions that handled transactions involving Pomeroon Trading. The FIU should also determine whether any transaction constituted trade‑based money laundering.
2. **Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)** : The DPP should review the evidence gathered in Zena Stoll’s civil lawsuit to determine whether criminal charges should be filed against Pomeroon Trading, Neil Passmore, and Duncan Turnbull for fraudulent misrepresentation, obtaining property by false pretences, and breach of director’s duties under the Companies Act.
3. **Guyana Police Force – Major Crimes Unit**: The police should investigate whether any Guyanese public official received any financial or other advantage from Pomeroon Trading or its associates.
4. **Guyana Securities Council**: The Council should review whether any Guyanese securities laws were violated in connection with the company’s announced IPO, which never took place.
5. **Parliamentary Select Committee**: The National Assembly should convene a Select Committee to investigate the Ministry of Agriculture’s role in endorsing Pomeroon Trading, including what due diligence was performed and why no action has been taken since the company’s collapse.
—
### VII. Obstacles to Justice: What Stands in the Way?
The GACN Investigation recognises that justice in this case will not be easily achieved. Several obstacles stand in the way:
**A. Jurisdictional Fragmentation**
The key players are located in three different countries: Canada (Klimat X/Carbon Done Right, James Tansey), the United Kingdom (Neil Passmore, David Lammy), and Guyana (Zena Stoll, the Ministry of Agriculture). Evidence is scattered across jurisdictions. No single law enforcement agency has clear jurisdiction over the entire transaction. Cooperation between the BCSC, the SFO, and Guyana’s FIU will be essential – but such cooperation is notoriously slow and politically sensitive.
**B. Political Connections**
David Lammy is now the Deputy Prime Minister and Justice Secretary of the United Kingdom – the very official responsible for the UK’s justice system. Any investigation that touches Lammy will face enormous political pressure. The fact that Lammy was an unpaid adviser to Pomeroon Trading and held shares in the company creates an obvious conflict of interest. The GACN Investigation calls upon the UK’s Independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests to examine whether Lammy’s conduct violated the Ministerial Code.
**C. Corporate Dissolution and Asset Shielding**
As of the date of this report, Carbon Done Right remains under a cease trade order, and its shares are suspended. The company may be on the verge of insolvency. If the company collapses, its assets – including whatever value remains in the Guyana Coconut segment – may be shielded from creditors and claimants, including Zena Stoll. Law enforcement agencies must act quickly before evidence is destroyed or assets are dissipated.
**D. The Carbon Credit “Green Shield”**
Carbon credit companies often enjoy a presumption of good faith because they are associated with environmental protection. This “green shield” can make regulators and the public less sceptical of their claims. The GACN Investigation urges regulators to look past the environmental rhetoric and examine the underlying financial transactions with the same rigour they would apply to any other public company.
—
### VIII. Conclusion: A Verdict of Systemic Failure
The story of Pomeroon Trading is not merely the story of a failed coconut farm. It is the story of a systemic failure of oversight and accountability across three countries.
In Guyana, the Ministry of Agriculture embraced the company without due diligence, issued press releases celebrating its investment, and has since remained silent as the company collapsed and a 91‑year‑old landowner was left with a ruined estate.
In Canada, a shell company acquired a Guyanese agricultural asset for a nominal price, rebranded itself as a carbon credit enterprise, and raised capital from public markets – all while making misleading disclosures and failing to file required documents, ultimately triggering a cease trade order.
In the United Kingdom, a senior politician served as an unpaid adviser and shareholder of the company, publicly championed its IPO, and then – according to the landowner – abandoned her when she needed his help.
And across all three countries, the regulators who should have been watching – the BCSC, the TSX Venture Exchange, the FIU of Guyana, the SFO – failed to intervene until it was too late.
**The Bitter Harvest is not yet over. But it can be. Law enforcement and financial regulators now have the evidence. The question is whether they will act.**
The GACN Investigation calls upon the authorities in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Guyana to launch immediate, coordinated, and transparent investigations into the Pomeroon Trading acquisition and the conduct of all individuals and entities involved. The people of Guyana – and especially Zena Stoll – deserve nothing less.
—
### References for Part Three
**Reference 1**
Yahoo News. (2026, April 9). David Lammy ‘ran away’ from eco-project that collapsed in chaos. Retrieved from https://uk.news.yahoo.com/david-lammy-ran-away-eco-180000089.html
**Reference 2**
CSIMarket. (2025, July 31). Carbon Done Right Developments Faces Regulatory Setback with Cease Trade Order. Retrieved from https://csimarket.com
**Reference 3**
Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization. (2025, August 5). Trading Halt – KLX. Retrieved from https://iiroc.mediaroom.com
**Reference 4**
TSX Venture Exchange. (n.d.). Bulletin Contents – Carbon Done Right. Retrieved from https://infoventure.tsx.com
**Reference 5**
The Globe and Mail. (2025). Carbon Done Right Announces Upsizing and Extension of Non-Brokered Private Placement. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com
**Reference 6**
The Globe and Mail. (2025). Carbon Done Right Announces Non-Brokered Private Placement and Shares for Debt Settlement. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com
**Reference 7**
InsiderTracking.com. (n.d.). Carbon Done Right Developments Inc. (V:KLX*CA). Retrieved from https://www.insidertracking.com
**Reference 8**
Klimat X. (n.d.). Our Team – Partnership with Pomeroon. Retrieved from https://www.klimatx.com
**Reference 9**
Guyana Times. (2025, November 14). Guyana pushes major coconut expansion in the Pomeroon. Retrieved from https://guyanatimesgy.com
**Reference 10**
Zonebourse. (2025, August 7). Neil Passmore – Pomeroon Trading Holdings acquired by Klimat X for $0.03 million. Retrieved from https://www.zonebourse.com
**Reference 11**
Initiative 20×20. (n.d.). Building coconut agroforestry systems in Suriname. Retrieved from https://initiative20x20.org
**Reference 12**
Government of Suriname. (2025, May 8). Pomeroon Suriname N.V. start mangrove rehabilitatieproject in Coronie. Retrieved from https://gov.sr
—
### References for Part Four
**Reference 1**
Céline Dostaler. (2024, September 24). What Is Securities Fraud in Canada? Retrieved from https://www.celinedostaler.ca
**Reference 2**
British Columbia Securities Commission. (n.d.). Enforcement FAQs. Retrieved from https://www.bcsc.bc.ca
**Reference 3**
British Columbia Securities Commission. (n.d.). Securities Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 418. Retrieved from https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca
**Reference 4**
Investment Executive. (2002, September 27). Regulator introduces new penalty guidelines for trading violations. Retrieved from https://www.investmentexecutive.com
**Reference 5**
CSA Staff Notice 51-364. (2025, July 3). Continuous Disclosure Review Program Activities for the fiscal years ended March 31, 2024 and March 31, 2025. Retrieved from https://www.securities-administrators.ca
**Reference 6**
Ainvest. (2025, July 30). Assessing the Long-Term Viability of Carbon Done Right Amid Regulatory Challenges. Retrieved from https://www.ainvest.com
**Reference 7**
Stockwatch. (2025, July 31). Carbon Done Right suspended by BCSC. Retrieved from https://www.stockwatch.com
**Reference 8**
Stockwatch. (2026, April 3). C-KLX News. Retrieved from https://www.stockwatch.com
**Reference 9**
CSIMarket. (2025, July 31). Carbon Done Right Developments Faces Regulatory Setback with Cease Trade Order. Retrieved from https://csimarket.com
**Reference 10**
CIRO. (2025, August 5). Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization Trading Halt – KLX. Retrieved from https://iiroc.mediaroom.com
**Reference 11**
Globe NewsWire. (2025, July 30). CARBON DONE RIGHT DEVELOPMENTS INC. ANNOUNCES CEASE TRADE ORDER. Retrieved from https://www.globenewswire.com
**Reference 12**
InsiderTracking.com. (n.d.). Carbon Done Right Developments Inc. (V:KLX*CA). Retrieved from https://www.insidertracking.com
**Reference 13**
Lexpert. (2026, January 26). Reverse takeover deals: Key steps, risks and advantages for issuers. Retrieved from https://www.lexpert.ca
**Reference 14**
The Globe and Mail. (2011, September 14). OSC head urges more scrutiny of reverse takeovers. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com
**Reference 15**
Endeavor Law. (2024, September 19). Going Public In Canada: Reverse Takeovers (RTOs). Retrieved from https://www.endeavorlaw.ca
**Reference 16**
Law Works Lawyers. (2024, July 24). Corporate directors’ conflicts of interests. Retrieved from https://www.lawworks.ca
**Reference 17**
McMillan LLP. (2025, June 10). Boardroom Ready: Duties and Best Practices for Canadian Directors. Retrieved from https://mcmillan.ca
**Reference 18**
Thomson Reuters Practical Law. (n.d.). Duties of Directors: Conflict of Interest Regime (Canada). Retrieved from https://ca.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com
**Reference 19**
Zonebourse. (n.d.). Neil Passmore – Director/Board Member at Carbon Done Right Developments Inc. Retrieved from https://www.zonebourse.com
**Reference 20**
Financial Intelligence Unit of Guyana. (2022, December 1). Issue No. 4: Measures to prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. Retrieved from https://fiu.gov.gy
**Reference 21**
INews Guyana. (2025, November 18). FIU rejects mischievous claims by VPAC. Retrieved from https://inewsguyana.com
**Reference 22**
Financial Intelligence Unit of Guyana. (2022, November 28). Reporting Entities. Retrieved from https://fiu.gov.gy
**Reference 23**
Moody’s. (2022, July 21). Trade-based money laundering: do you know the signs? Retrieved from https://www.moodys.com
**Reference 24**
UK Bribery Act 2010. (c. 23). Section 6 – Bribery of foreign public officials. Retrieved from https://www.legislation.gov.uk
**Reference 25**
The Guardian. (2025, December 7). UK will not be haven for dirty money, Lammy to say in corruption crackdown. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com
**Reference 26**
The Globe and Mail. (2025). Carbon Done Right Announces Non-Brokered Private Placement and Shares for Debt Settlement. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com